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I. INTRODUCTION
The dialogue between Europe and Africa has reached a new level of high 
intensity. The recent succession of European meetings, mini-summits with 
EU Member States, and visits by senior European politicians to the African 
continent, testify not only to the importance of this dialogue, but also the cen-
tral place of the subject of migration and security in this dialogue. The de-
mographic, economic and environmental issues underlying the development 
of the African continent, as well as the migration and security issues, are 
increasingly structuring the external actions taken by the European Union 
and the African Union Member States today. This is not a new dimension of 
Euro-African relations. However, the issue of migration and security has be-
come unprecedented in recent years, which needs to be addressed in the wake 
of the migration crisis experienced by the EU. In the first place, the Europeans 
who had not expected the arrival of millions of people were caught off guard, 
even though these flows were predictable. The concentration of refugees, 
particularly from Africa, at the gates of Europe, was indeed a situation that 
posed a threat to the fragile equilibrium. People in Europe are now wondering 
whether they may also expect a similar migration from Libya and the Sahel- 
ian region. Secondly, despite an attempt to establish a common framework 
in emergency, no solution to this ‘migration crisis’ has come from an internal 
political agreement within the EU. A global approach to the issue of migra-
tion and security is fundamental for the EU’s external policy. It sets out the 
modalities for the EU’s policy dialogue and operational cooperation with third 
countries in the area of migration and security, on the basis of clearly defined 
priorities, taking into account the strategic objectives of the EU. 
The aim of this article is to examine and assess the current state of EU-AU 
cooperation in the light of the various challenges originating from the migra-
tion and collective security issues. The EU is firmly anchored in the overall 
framework of its foreign policy development of cooperation, especially in the 
field of migration and security. It is also important to emphasize that this 
policy aims at developing mutually beneficial partnerships in line with the 
interests of the EU and those of the African Union (AU) member states, and 
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that it is necessary to ensure effective management of migration flows and the 
question of collective security. We are assessing the importance of what has 
happened in the Eastern Mediterranean region to grasp what is happening 
today in the relations between the EU and Africa. With the ‘deal’ with Turkey, 
the Europeans have established a method for drastically curbing the irregular 
arrivals of migrants, regardless of whether they are refugees or not, instead 
of solving the migration problem. In the European area, contradictions and 
limitations are primarily related to the political sensitivity of the issues.
II. A NEW PARADIGM OF THE AFRICAN UNION 
– EUROPEAN UNION PARTNERSHIP
The European Union, as an international organization with a regional 
scope, is dynamically developing its ability to act on the international are-
na.1 This is happening mainly due to the transfer of some competences to 
conduct international policy at the level of European Union institutions.2 The 
African continent has always been an area of particular interest for many 
European countries. Since the establishment of the EEC, economic relations 
with African countries have been an operative element of its activities. The 
political dimension of the relations between the EEC and African countries 
was shaped as changes were introduced into the treaties. Within the basic 
political and economic dimensions and, more recently, the areas of security 
and migration, there are several points of mutual interaction: the European 
Union and individual African states, the European Union and regional eco-
nomic communities (e.g. ECOWAS) or the European Union and the African 
Union. The system should also include bilateral links between European and 
African countries. 
Relations between the European Union and the African Union were for-
mally initiated during the first summit held in Cairo (Egypt) in 2000. Since 
then, we can talk about the existence of a political dialogue based on the 
adopted institutional solutions which took the form of regular meetings of 
ministers and senior officials. The establishment of the New Partnership for 
1 In contrast to the African Union, the European Union integration process is a complex and 
long-lasting and multi-branch phenomenon. Today’s European Union was created as a result of 
a multi-stage integration process. The above process was characterized by the transition from 
negative integration to positive integration. Negative integration concerned the process of re-
moving all trade barriers between Member States, while positive integration was associated with 
a high degree of coordination and harmonization of national policies of individual EU Member 
States. This process has become possible thanks to the transfer of some of the competences of 
the Member States of the European Union. Positive integration consists in changing the deci-
sion-making system both at the level of individual Member States and in EU bodies. This inte-
gration causes the transition from its lower level, which is the free trade zone to its higher level, 
which is the Economic and Monetary Union. For more on the subject see Czaplinski (2003): 543; 
Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2007): 188. 
2 See Article 47 TUE, Article 356 TFUE.
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Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, which led to the creation of the Af-
rican Union in 2002, was important for the further actions of the European 
Union, which eventually led to Africa embarking on the path of integration. 
The emergence of NEPAD and the African Union was considered a turning 
point and a sign that African leaders are determined to take control and re-
sponsibility for change in Africa.3 
At the Brussels summit in December 2005, the European Council adopted 
a document called the European Union Strategy for Africa: the Euro-African 
pact to accelerate development.4 It was to be an expression of the coordina-
tion of the European Union’s policy towards Africa treated as a continent for 
which specific actions are to be taken. The strategy was, therefore, an ex-
pression of the consolidated position and approach of the European Union to 
the formulation of a policy aimed at Africa as a whole. The strategy also took 
into account relations at the level of links with other entities, covering a wide 
range of issues in various selected fields. The Strategy contains provisions 
on cooperation with the African Union and individual African countries in 
order to: maintain peace, security and stability, and fight against terrorism 
and arms trade,5 stimulate economic growth; education and health protection; 
and the protection of human rights. The adopted document was supposed to 
be a response to the needs of the African continent, assuming that the Euro-
pean Union’s policy towards Africa will contribute to the achievement of the 
UN Millennium Development Goals, such as counteracting poverty, hunger, 
disease and environmental degradation.6 
The first years of the strategy’s existence were a test for the EU, because 
the way in which its provisions were implemented and to what extent, would 
determine further actions to be taken on the African continent. Initially, it 
was noticeable that they were conducted on the political and operational lev-
els. While the political commitment was based on the principles set out in the 
strategy, the operational commitment constituted infrastructure and peace 
support under the African Peace Fund (APF) (e.g. AMIS mission in Darfur), 
3 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is the pan-African strategic 
framework for the socio-economic development of the continent. NEPAD was officially adopt-
ed by the AU in 2002 as the primary mechanism to coordinate the pace and impact of Africa’s 
development in the twenty-first century. Its primary objective is to provide a new mechanism, 
spearheaded by African leaders, to: eradicate poverty, place African countries, both individually 
and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, halt the marginalization of 
Africa in the globalization process, accelerate the empowerment of women, fully integrate Africa 
into the global economy. 
4 Bach (2008): 355–370. 
5 The European Council underlines the importance of a comprehensive and proportionate 
response to the threat from terrorism. The European Council adopts the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy (doc. 14469/4/05 REV 4) which sets out a framework for work to prevent radicalization 
and the recruitment to terrorism, to protect citizens and infrastructure, to pursue and investigate 
terrorists, and to improve the response to the consequences of attacks. 
6 On 8 September 2000, following a three-day Millennium Summit of world leaders gathered 
in New York at the headquarters of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly adopted some 
60 goals regarding peace; development; environment; human rights; the vulnerable, hungry, and 
poor; Africa; and the United Nations which is called Millennium Declaration (Resolution 55/2)
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the AU Nyerere program for higher education and student exchanges, and 
the Erasmus Mundus program, which was extended to include students from 
African universities as well.7 The Union’s strategy was important in the at-
tempts to create the impression of transparency in actions for Africa and to 
increase the coherence of EU policies by coordinating the activities of the Eu-
ropean Commission and the Member States for Africa. The cohesion of EU ac-
tivities was most visible in the area of the development policy. The EU Mem-
ber States once again were not uniform at the level of EU institutions and in 
their positions regarding the imposition of responsibility for helping African 
countries and different forms of aid sourced from a common budget. However, 
despite controversies, this solution turned out to benefit both sides. Coordina-
tion prevents the duplication of activities and reduces the cost of managing 
assistance. The Commission’s Communication of 27 June 2007 stated that 
this strategy proved to be useful as a political framework and as a political 
process. The EU became a better, more united and more effective partner. The 
strategy was also a stimulus for further actions. Already the fifth meeting of 
EU and African ministers in December 2005 in Bamako, Mali, indicated the 
need to bring the partnership between the EU and Africa to a new strategic 
level and prepare a joint strategy for the European Union and African Union 
cooperation. It was also recommended that the partnership between the two 
institutions should no longer continue to be merely the EU’s unilateral strate-
gy for Africa. To be effective, sustainable and inclusive, the new strategy had 
to place job creation at the top of its priorities. Hence the need for new forms 
and new areas of cooperation, first and foremost in the area of education and 
training. It is essential to contribute to the building of an Africa of skills, to 
develop centres of excellence, and to encourage the emergence of an educated, 
dynamic, employable and active population. 
III. POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Since 2007 the Common EU-Africa Strategy has been framing the basis 
of a political dialogue by defining the ‘values, interests and goals that are 
common’ to the two institutions.8 The re-integration of Morocco into the AU 
in 2017 helped to establish a parallel EU-AU partnership, at least in appe- 
7 In the area of higher education (HE), the priorities agreed for EU-Africa cooperation are 
to: promote the mobility of students, scholars, researchers and staff; harmonize higher educa-
tion in Africa; enhance quality assurance and accreditation in African universities; and develop 
centres of excellence in Africa, in particular through the Pan-African University. The mobility 
of students, scholars, researchers and staff is to continue to be supported, not least by: the Afri-
can Union Mwalimu Nyerere Scholarship Scheme; the Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme; 
and the Erasmus+ programme and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions. Harmonization is to be 
achieved through the Tuning Africa project and quality assurance via the Harmonization, Quality 
Assurance and Accreditation (HAQAA) programme. 
8 Bach (2008): 355–370.
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arance.9 However, the institutional limits of the AU restrict the reciprocity of 
a political dialogue. Although the AU Member states are not ready or willing 
to give up even a small part of their sovereign right to the AU, it is hoped that 
they will eventually do so for the sake of the common goal. The adoption of 
a common position is all the more complicated on sensitive issues such as the 
migration policy. In its report on the relationships between the African Union 
and the European Union on the eve of the joint summit in November 2017, the 
International Crisis Group noted that ‘their relationship is essentially that of 
donor and recipient, but both are reluctant to characterize it as such.’ Despite 
the repeated reference to ‘partnerships’ or even a ‘Euro-African’ dialogue, 
the representatives of African countries suffer from a lack of transparency in 
terms of Europe’s modus operandi and are seldom involved in the drafting of 
EU external policies which, through the externalization process, will be imple-
mented in African countries and will affect them directly. 
Although EU Member States frequently participate in AU’s summits, 
there is no reciprocity when it comes to EU meetings. Moreover, the Euro-Afri-
can dialogue is often led by certain European Member States, notably France 
and Germany. The system is still dominated by historic bilateralism which 
has recently grown even stronger. Although attempts have been made by the 
EU High Representative to change the hegemony of EU Member States when 
it comes to European-African talks, it is still these States that continue to 
lead the political dialogue between Europe and Africa. In spite of this obvious 
bias, the European Union is seemingly convinced that in the last ten years di-
alogue has become ‘much less ideological and much more concrete.’ The Euro-
pean Parliament’s report on the revised strategy in 2017 indeed noted that is 
a ‘the development of an equal, long lasting, mutually beneficial relationship.’ 
This approach was also reflected in the central idea of the Abidjan Summit on 
which it was decided to change the policy and rather than continue the EU’s 
direct funding of development projects in Africa, to promote private invest-
ment on the African continent instead. 
The underlying goal is to create opportunities for young people to gain 
education and skills which will help to reduce the structural causes of mi-
gration.10 The African Union is also aware of the excessive dependency that 
persists regarding external aid, and of the impediments that this represents 
for its bargaining power in political negotiations. Hence, AU Member States 
have made a commitment to increase their contributions to the Continental 
 9 Van Selm (2002): 143–160. 
10 ‘There is no doubt that in many African countries violent conflict represents a major polit-
ical and social challenge. Despite their differing constellations, what these conflicts have in com-
mon is poor governance and its concomitant side-effects, ranging from corruption and oppression 
to poor socio-economic participation and a general lack of prospects, which in turn represents 
a leading cause of insecurity. Poor governance, tends to be closely associated with a loss of legiti-
macy and authority, favouring a spiral of violence and subsequent conflicts. At the same time, the 
nature of the conflicts has changed very profoundly. In addition to conflicts perceived as ethno-po-
litical, or disputes over power and resource distribution, one is confronted with transnational 
terrorist violence combined with organized crime, diminishing resources, and climate change: 
factors that collectively contribute to the weakening of governmental structures.’
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Organization regarding activities related to peace and security. African States 
are still often silent partners, despite frequent calls voiced by the African civ-
il society for its leaders to assume their responsibilities in migration-related 
tragedies. However, no joint proposal on the part of the African States has 
even been drafted to implement a joint response to these challenges.
IV. THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  
ON THE MIGRATION AND SECURITY ISSUE
The African Union and the European Union promote a constructive and 
multidimensional approach to migration and collective security challenges in 
addition to the existing dialogues and frameworks.11 The key objectives in this 
area are to deepen the cooperation between Africa and Europe and to continue 
the dialogue on migration and collective security, with the objective of ad-
dressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. The 
EU and AU stress the importance of managing irregular migration effectively, 
in a spirit of partnership and shared responsibility.12 They do so in full respect 
of national and international laws and human rights obligations, in order to 
maximize the development potential of both Africa and Europe. 
1. Migration at the heart of Africa-European Union relations
The context of EU-Africa cooperation has evolved considerably since the 
2014 Brussels summit. Migration flows and the refugee crisis are at the heart 
of the relations between the two continents.13 What is more, refugees are also 
putting pressure on African countries.14 The 2015 Valletta Summit on Migra-
tion, which brought together European and African leaders and organizations, 
11 ‘The European Council noted the increasing importance of migration issues for the EU and 
its Member States and the fact that recent developments have led to mounting public concern in 
some Member States. It underlines the need for a balanced, global and coherent approach, cov-
ering policies to combat illegal immigration and, in cooperation with third countries, harnessing 
the benefits of legal migration. It recalls that migration issues are a central element in the EU’s 
relations with a broad range of third countries, including, in particular, the regions neighbouring 
the Union, namely the eastern, south eastern and Mediterranean regions, and notes the impor-
tance of ensuring that the appropriate level of financial resources is allocated to these policies. 
The EU will strengthen its dialogue and cooperation with all those countries on migration issues, 
including return management, in a spirit of partnership and having regard to the circumstances 
of each country concerned’; Balleix (2013): 296.
12 Burges (2011): 13–15; Cholewinski (2005): 95–119; Bigo (2005): 77–83; Pascouau (2010): 
744.
13 The term ‘migration’ refers here to every kind of human movement from one place to 
another with the intention of settling, permanently or temporarily, whatever the reasons of the 
movement; in this sense, ‘migration’ covers both voluntary (labour, family reunification, study) 
and forced migration; Czaplinski (2003): 543; Dony (2010): 29–59; Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2007): 
188; Wihtol De Wenden, De Tinguy (1995): 13–53.
14 Fassi, Lucarelli (2017): 12179; Van Selm (2002):143–160.
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marked a turning point in the EU’s foreign policy towards Africa, with the dis-
course now focused on finding solutions to migratory flows and their triggers. 
The agreement between the EU and Turkey inspired a new EU partnership 
framework that started in June 2016. Under this framework, tailor-made ‘mi-
gration pacts’ were to be subsequently negotiated by the EU and some Afri-
can and the Middle East States. However, this agreement was criticized for 
introducing conditionality. It was also feared that rather than strengthening 
the cooperation between European and African states, it might create even 
more suspicion among actors participating in combatting illegal migration. 
The proponents of the proposed ‘migration pacts’ praised their multidimen-
sional nature, as they were expected to include both short-term measures to 
manage continuous flows and asylum applications, and long-term measures 
to reduce the factors conducive to the migration economic underground. The 
opponents, on the contrary, believed that reducing poverty was unlikely to re-
duce migratory flows on its own, since a person requires a minimum of means 
to migrate.15 
The above concerns about freedom, security and justice have led EU Mem-
ber states to include migration in EU security policy issues.16 Numerous meas-
ures have also been adopted by the EU to protect the territories of the EU 
Member States and their citizens from the migratory threat. A number of 
action plans have been implemented, including agencies consisting of border 
guards and coast guards deployed at the external borders of the European Un-
ion and within individual Member States. There were also computerized data 
control systems of individuals created. However, despite all the efforts taken 
by the Member States to prevent the arrival of irregular migrants in Europe, 
the flow has not dried up. 
Migrants are determined to come to Europe by all means necessary, even 
at the risk of their lives. They do not hesitate to embark on makeshift boats to 
land on the mainland of the Old Continent. They risk their lives, being at the 
mercy of smugglers who often expose them to life-threatening dangers, such as 
forcing three hundred of them to travel on a small boat that can only hold one 
hundred passengers. Sometimes they are abused during their journey, or they 
find themselves exploited once they reach their destination. However, if they 
find themselves destitute, they often have no other possibility but to turn to 
the services of smugglers, trying to obtain false identity documents or to cross 
the border illegally. Migrant smuggling has thus become a lucrative business 
fuelled by border closures. Sometimes migrants try ways to get around the 
authorities and enter Europe on their own. In either case, however, irregular 
migrants are vulnerable people who are more likely to be exploited. Therefore 
it is imperative that States reconsider the meaning of the very notion of col-
lective security and integrate it in the concept of human security, in order to 
provide a framework of full protection of migrants. 
15 Kaddous (2010): 61–79; Loescher (2002): 33–45; Huysmans (2006): 208;  (2000): 751–777.
16 L’helgoualch (2011): 317; Van Selm (2002): 143–160; Lavenex (2008): 938–955.
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As can be seen, migration is closely related to the collective security is-
sue.17 Consequently, immigration is seen as a problem related to crime and 
terrorism, and is therefore included in security policy issues. Immigration has 
become a matter of the internal collective security concerns of individual EU 
Member states, who wish to control the flow of migrants and to that end have 
established criteria that must be met by persons authorized to enter their 
territory. 
Under EU Treaties, non-EU citizens who meet these criteria are allowed 
to enter the territory of EU member States. Once in the EU, they may travel 
within the Schengen area, but under certain conditions. The lack of border 
controls between EU Member States has therefore facilitated mobility. How-
ever, this openness also facilitates the movement of criminals and people in an 
irregular situation. This leads to a situation in which data on individuals who 
have entered Europe irregularly are not available and such individuals will 
subsequently escape police controls or surveillance. Their activities are on the 
black market, which often contributes to the spread of other illegal activities. 
Irregular migration also creates other problems for EU Member States, be-
cause undocumented people are more difficult to trace and it is more difficult 
to understand where they come from, and what their goals and intentions are. 
Thus, when a person arrives in Europe without documents, it is necessary to 
determine whether this is for economic reasons or whether the person is flee-
ing a war or persecution. There are many people who are fleeing ISIS these 
days. But some migrants are likely to break into Europe to convey the ideology 
of Daesh. As a result, irregular migration channels may contain harmful ele-
ments entering the EU and staying beyond the control and the mechanisms of 
the security system. 
Migration is therefore mingled with security in two ways. It is no longer 
that it is only the migrants’ security that is at stake. It is also the internal 
security of States that is at stake.
2.  An Africa-European Union strategic partnership for peace  
and collective security
In the last decade, Africa has seen a decline in the number of conflicts, and 
peace reigns over most of its territory today.18 The persistent fragility of peace 
and security and multiple threats to governance and the rule of law have 
17 Megherbi, Aumond (2010): 17–37.
18 The African Union officially recognizes eight Regional Economic Communities and two Re-
gional Mechanisms with a mandate in peace and security. These are the Economic Community of 
West African States ECOWAS, the Eco-nomic Community of Central African States ECCAS, the 
Southern African Development Community SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and South-
ern Africa COMESA, the East African Community EAC, the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development IGAD, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States CEN-SAD and the Arab Maghreb 
Union UMA, as well as the East African Stand-by Force EASF and the North Africa Regional Ca-
pability NARC, African Union and REC/RMs, Memorandum of Understanding, Algiers, African 
Union, 2008.
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nonetheless demonstrated that multiple crises may lead to devastating con-
flicts. Storms result from the convergence between the population explosion 
of the young population, rapid urbanization, water scarcity, other climate-re-
lated challenges, omnipresent food insecurity, and delays in industrialization 
and the development of infrastructural investments. All these factors, which 
particularly complicate the advent of peace, security and sustainable develop-
ment in Africa, also have tangible consequences for Europe, particularly in the 
form of increased flows of irregular migrants. Conflicts and security will there-
fore remain the chief issues in Europe-Africa relations. The EU has provided 
essential support for peace and security in Africa over the last decade, against 
a backdrop of a dramatic increase in security interdependence between the 
two continents. Most of the EU support has been through the African Peace 
Facility (APF), which has revitalized peace and security efforts. The funds 
obtained allowed African security institutions to deploy African troops to en-
sure peace and stability, with the idea of bringing ‘African solutions to African 
problems.’19
These solutions include the AMISOM mission led by the AU to carry 
out coercive operations against Al-Shabab in Somalia and the AFISMA mis-
sion led by Africa to stabilize the situation in Mali. Apart from the APF, the 
EU also manages a number of missions on the African soil under its CSDP. 
EU-Africa cooperation on peace and security should nevertheless undergo 
radical changes in the coming years. The EU Political and Security Committee 
recently called for more balanced FPA funds, with greater emphasis on sup-
port for institutional capacity building through the African Peace and Securi-
ty Architecture (AAPS) of the AU.20 This aims to foster greater African owner-
ship of African-led PSOs and a move from crisis-driven funding to longer-term 
capacity-building in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. 
Their reliance on external funding is, moreover, a source of frustration for 
AU Member States.21
Unlike previous roadmaps, there are five objectives with indicators that 
will be pursued jointly by the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for the op-
erationalization of the AAPS. While the AU seeks to diversify the sources of 
funding for its activities in the service of peace and security,22 the EU itself 
will have to define the areas where it wishes to support the AAPS, which will 
constitute a strategic line compatible with the new road. As the AU Peace 
Fund grows, issues of alignment and coordination will become critical in EU 
decisions on support for the AU activities from 2017.
All this leads us to the question of the future directions for the Africa-EU 
partnership in general. Overall, the EU needs to be clear about its role in 
promoting peace and security.23 European actors will have to make a choice in 
using the APF, either to assert their own security interests or to give African 
19 Kilingebiel (2005): 35–44.
20 Bachmann (2011): 1–73.
21 Dersso (2010).
22 Williams (2011): 6.
23 Labayle (2010): 3–27.
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organizations the means to deal with their own security problems. To define 
its strategic position, the EU will at least have a common vision of the APF. 
The Africa-EU Partnership for Peace and Security has been increasingly in-
stitutionalized, notably through a regular dialogue between the AU Peace and 
Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee. Doubts still 
remain as to the strategic value of this partnership.24 The EU and the AU do 
not share the same vision of peace and security. This is partly because the 
EU’s security agenda is largely conditioned by the individual interests of its 
Member States and partly because EU countries are not accustomed to view-
ing Africa as an interlocutor that is politically or strategically important. But 
things are changing: as proof, the 2017 G20 agenda placed great emphasis 
on Africa. To develop a true strategic partnership, the EU and Africa must 
move beyond the donor-recipient relationship to a more equitable partnership, 
based on the same inventory of threats to peace and security.
V. CONCLUSION
The implementation of the strategic partnership is a challenge that needs 
to be addressed. It is essential that that the multilateral and trans-state ap-
proach to crisis prevention and resolution of the African continent problem 
is adopted. This approach is not new and was already advocated in the past. 
However, it must be complemented not only by a ‘bottom up’ approach that in-
volves African states investing in multilateral organizations, but also through 
coordinated support from EU member States to their African counterparts. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge of the partnership is a joint challenge: to agree 
upon a common pace of change between the EU and Africa. The political and 
legal norms of the European Union, the habits of its officials and their method 
of recruitment, as well as the temporality of current affairs, are far removed 
from those of an African institution. The mechanisms for cooperation whose 
foundations remain trust and equitable exchange, should take this into ac-
count. The establishment of a cooperation system that would articulate bilat-
eralism and multilateralism, between state and non-state actors such as, for 
example, African civil society, should be encouraged. With regard to the latter 
concept, it would still be necessary to specify its definition and involvement 
in the partnership. From this point of view, the comprehensive approach en-
visaged by the EU-Africa partnership in the face of its fragility needs to be 
further explored. 
The EU is committed to working alongside all the operational actors to 
address the complex challenges of migration and human mobility, as well 
as those posed by mixed flows of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. 
The effective return and readmission of persons not in need of protection is 
a key priority for maintaining the credibility and smooth functioning of our 
24 Koff (2008): 335.
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asylum and migration systems, with full respect for the human rights of 
migrants and the principle of non-refoulement. In this context, the Commis-
sion has recently proposed an ambitious EU Return Action Plan which in-
cludes a strategy for intensifying cooperation with immigrants’ countries on 
return and readmission agreements. Encouraging and facilitating voluntary 
returns to the country of origin remains the preferred solution. Whenever 
possible, however, the EU is mobilizing all the relevant policies, including its 
foreign policy as well as its development aid and trade between the two re-
gional organizations, to encourage its partners to cooperate on the readmis-
sion issue, in accordance with the ‘give more to receive more’ principle. To 
this end, EU cooperation with AU countries will also focus on strengthening 
the capacity to respond in a timely manner to requests for readmission and 
on facilitating and speeding up the identification of nationals. At the same 
time, the EU will invest in supporting the reintegration of returnees and 
in improving the capacity of the countries of origin of the returnees to help 
their readmission and reintegration. 
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THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY  
AS AN ABSOLUTE IMPERATIVE
S u m m a r y
At a time when Africa is strengthening its attractiveness, acquiring its own story and arousing 
the interest of new partners, and when Europe is going through an important economic and in-
stitutional crisis, what can the new bases for cooperation between the European Union and the 
African Union be? The Abidjan summit in November 2017 offered an opportunity to reflect on 
the achievements of bi-regional cooperation between Africa and Europe in the field of migration, 
peace and security. It emphasized the priority of education, support for sustainable and inclusive 
development, and multi-sector cooperation, stating that all of them be carried out within the 
framework of horizontal cooperation favouring reciprocal Africa-European Union contributions. 
However, one must be aware of the constraints, weighing on both partners, which hinder imple-
mentation of the agreed strategies. 
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